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Abstract
In this paper, we accomplish two objectives: First, we provide a new mathematical characterization
of the value function for impulse control problems with implementation delay and present a direct
solution method that differs from its counterparts that use quasi-variational inequalities. Our method
is direct, in the sense that we do not have to guess the form of the solution and we do not have to
prove that the conjectured solution satisfies conditions of a verification lemma. Second, by employ-
ing this direct solution method, we solve two examples that involve decision delays: an exchange
rate intervention problem and a problem of labor force optimization.
Key Words: Optimal stopping, Impulse Control, Implementation Delay, Firing and Hiring Deci-
sions.
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1 Introduction
Implementation delays occur naturally in decision-making problems. Many corporations face regulatory
delays, which need to be taken into account when the corporations make decisions under uncertainty.
A decision made will be carried out only after certain amount of time elapses, for example, due to
regulatory reasons. The decision involves optimally exercising a real option or optimally manipulating
(with some associated cost) a state variable, which is the source of uncertainty. Several problems that fit
into this framework can be found in the literature: The work of Bar-Ilan and Strange [6] constitutes the
first study considering how delays affect rational investment behavior. Keppo and Peura [17] consider
the decision making problem a bank has to solve when it is faced with a minimum capital requirement,
a random income, and delayed (and costly) recapitalization. The bank’s problem is to determine when
to raise capital from its shareholders and the amount to be raised, given that this transaction requires a
heavy preparatory work, which causes delay. Bar-Ilan and Strange [7] consider (irreversible) sequential
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(2 stage) investment decision problems given two sources of delay: one due to market analysis in the
first stage and the other due to construction of a production facility in the second stage. In each stage the
firm’s problem is to decide whether to continue entering into the market (of that product) or to abandon
it. See also Subramanian and Jarrow [24] who consider the problem of a trader (who is not a price taker)
who wants to liquidate her position and encounters execution delays in an illiquid market. Alvarez and
Keppo [3] study the impact of delivery lags on irreversible investment demand under revenue uncertainty.
Øksendal et. al. [20], [15] consider the classical stochastic control of stochastic delays systems.
The problem of finding an optimal decision (in the presence of delays) can be characterized as a
stochastic impulse control problem or an optimal stopping problem. In the papers cited above the im-
pulse control problem or the optimal stopping problem were solved by using a system of quasi-variational
inequalities. (See e.g. Bensoussan and Lions [8] and Øksendal and Sulem [21] for the relationship be-
tween control problems and quasi-variational inequalities.) In a different approach, Øksendal and Sulem
[22] solve a version of delay problems, in which the controller decides on the magnitude of control at
the time of decision-making before any delay (the decision is implemented after some delay). They con-
vert the optimal impulse control problem with delayed reaction into a no-delay optimal stopping/impulse
control problem. Note that choosing the control in this way introduces strong path dependence of the
controlled process.
Here, we solve the impulse control problems with delays directly and the magnitude of the impulses
are chosen at the time of action, not at the time of decision-making, by providing a new characterization
of the value function. The controlled process is a non-Markov process in this case, too, since depending
on when a point in the state space is reached, it has different roles. But the controlled process in this
case regenerates after a decision is implemented, and the value of the state process during the delay
time depends on the past only through the value of the state process at the time of decision-making. We
will only consider the threshold and band policies in this paper, since we expect that the non-Markovian
structure will make finding the optimal solution much more difficult if we allow more general strategies.
For example, because of the lack of Strong Markov property, we were unable to prove the concavity
properties of the value function when the admissible strategies were a superset of band or threshold
strategies.
Our results rely on the works of Dynkin [13], [14] (see e.g. Theorem 16.4) and Dayanik and Karatzas
[12], who give a general characterization of optimal stopping times of one dimensional diffusions, and
on the work of Dayanik and Egami [11], who characterize the value function of stochastic impulse
control problems. Our method is direct, in the sense that we do not have to guess the form of the
solution and we do not have to prove that the conjectured solution satisfies conditions of a verification
lemma as all the methods in the above literature do. Other works similar in vein to ours that provide
different characterizations of the value function of impulse/singular control problems for one dimensional
diffusions rather than solving variational inequalities are Alvarez [1], [2]; Alvarez and Virtanen [4]; and
Weerasighe [25].
We give a geometric characterization of the value function, specifically, we find very general con-
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ditions on the reward function and the coefficients of the underlying diffusion under which the value
function can be linearized (in the continuation region) after a suitable transformation. Then the prob-
lem of determining the value function is equivalent to determining the slope (if admissible strategies are
threshold strategies), the slope and the intercept (if admissible strategies are band strategies) from first
order conditions. To show the efficacy of our methodology we apply it to an optimization problem of
a central bank that needs to carry out exchange rate intervention (this is the Krugman model of interest
rates considered, among others, in Mundaca and Øksendal [18]) when there is delay in the implemen-
tation of its decisions. Also, using our methodology we will find optimal hiring and firing decisions
of a firm that faces stochastic demand and has to conform to regulatory delays. Other works that deal
with labor optimization problems are Bentolila and Bertola [9], and Shepp and Shiryaev [23] who model
firing and hiring decisions as singular controls. It is also worth pointing out that an impulse control study
when the underlying process is a superposition of a Brownian motion and a compound Poisson process
(when the jumps are of phase type) is given by [5] with management of foreign exchange reserves and
labor optimization in mind.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we give a characterization of general
threshold strategies with implementation delays and provide an easily implemented algorithm to find the
value function and the optimal control. To illustrate our methodology, we will solve a delayed version
of an example from Mundaca and Øksendal [18] (also see Øksendal [19]). A similar problem to the
one we consider was solved in [22] in which the controller decides on the magnitude of control at the
time of decision-making before any delay. In Section 3, we work with a band policy. In this section
we work on the specific example of optimal hiring and firing decisions rather than providing a general
characterization for the value function. We again provide an easily implemented algorithm to find the
optimal control. Finally, we conclude in Section 4.
2 Optimal Threshold Strategies
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a complete probability space with a standard Brownian motion W = {Wt; t ≥ 0} and
consider the diffusion process X0 with state pace I = (c, d) ⊆ R and dynamics
dX0t = µ(X
0
t )dt+ σ(X
0
t )dWt (2.1)
for some Borel functions µ : I → R and σ : I → (0,∞). (We assume that the functions µ and σ
are sufficiently regular so that (2.1) makes sense.) Here we take c and d to be a natural boundaries. We
use “0” as the superscript to indicate that X0 is the uncontrolled process. We denote the infinitesimal
generator of X0 by A and consider the ODE (A − α)v(x) = 0. This equation has two fundamental
solutions, ψ(·) and ϕ(·). We set ψ(·) to be the increasing and ϕ(·) to be the decreasing solution. ψ(c+) =
0, ϕ(c+) = ∞ and ψ(d−) = ∞, ϕ(d−) = 0 because both c and d are natural boundaries. First, we
define an increasing function
F (x) ,
ψ(x)
ϕ(x)
. (2.2)
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Next, following [14], p. 238, we define concavity of a function with respect F as follows: A real valued
function u is called F -concave on (c, d) if, for every c < l < r < d and x ∈ [l, r],
u(x) ≥ u(l)F (r)− F (x)
F (r)− F (l) + u(r)
F (x)− F (l)
F (r)− F (l) .
Suppose that at any time t ∈ R+ and any state x ∈ R+, we can intervene and give the system an
impulse ξ ∈ R. Once the system gets intervened, the point moves from x to y ∈ R+ with associated
reward and cost. An impulse control for the system is a double sequence,
ν = (T1, T2, ....Ti....; ξ1, ξ2, ...ξi....) (2.3)
where 0 ≤ T1 < T2 < .... is an increasing sequence of F-stopping times such that Ti+1 − Ti ≥ ∆, and
ξ1, ξ2... are F(Ti+∆)− measurable random variables representing impulses exercised at the corresponding
intervention times Ti with ξi ∈ Z for all i where Z ⊂ R is a given set of admissible impulse values. The
controlled process until the first intervention time is described as follows:
dXt = µ(Xt)dt+ σ(Xt)dWt, 0 ≤ t < T1 +∆XT1+∆ = Γ(X(T1+∆)−, ξ1) (2.4)
with some mapping Γ : (c, d) × R → R. We consider the following performance measure associated
with ν ∈ V (= a collection of admissible strategies),
Jν(x) = Ex

∫ ∞
0
e−αsf(Xs)ds +
∑
Ti<∞
e−α(Ti+∆)K(X(Ti+∆)−,XTi+∆)

 . (2.5)
The objective (we shall call it the delay problem) is to find the optimal strategy ν∗ (if it exists) and the
value function:
v(x) , sup
ν∈V
Jν(x) = Jν
∗
(x). (2.6)
Remark 2.1. The controlled process X is not a Markov process, since depending on whether a point is
reached in the time interval [Ti, Ti + ∆) or not, that point has different roles. (The controlled process
might jump or not at a given point depending on how it reaches to that point.) However, 1) the process
regenerates at times {Ti +∆}i∈N, and 2) the value of the process at time T ∈ (Ti, Ti+∆), XT , depends
on the information up to Ti, FTi , only through the value of the process at time Ti, XTi . Instead of finding
the optimal strategy for a non-Markov process, we will use the hints of Markovian features to find the
optimal threshold strategy (see Assumption 2.1).
The following is a standing assumption in Sections 2.1 and 2.2.
Assumption 2.1. We make the following assumptions in this section:
(a) We will assume that the set of admissible strategies is limited to threshold strategies. These strate-
gies are determined by specifying two numbers a ∈ (c, d) and b ∈ (c, d) as follows: At the time
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the uncontrolled process hits level b, the controller decides to reduce the level of the process from
ξTi− = b to a < b, through an intervention, and save the continuously incurred cost (which is high
if the process is at a high level). But the implementation of this decision is subject to a delay of ∆
units of time. Note that ξ(Ti+∆)− might be less than a. In that case the impulse applied increases
the value of the process. Otherwise, if the value of the process is greater than a at time (Ti +∆)−
then the intervention reduces the level of the process to a.
(b) The running cost function f : (c, d)→ R is a continuous functions that satisfies
E
x
[∫ ∞
0
e−αs|f(Xs)|ds
]
<∞. (2.7)
(c) For any point x ∈ (c, d), we assume
K(x, x) < 0. (2.8)
We make this assumption to account for the fixed cost of making an intervention.
2.1 Characterization of the Value Function
In this section, we will show that when we apply a suitable transformation to the value function cor-
responding to a particular threshold strategy (that is identified by a pair (a, b)), the transformed value
function is linear on (0, F (b)). This characterization will become important in determining the optimal
threshold strategy in the next section.
Let us define
g(x) , Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−αsf(X0s )ds
]
(2.9)
The following identity, which can be derived using the Strong Markov Property of X0, will come handy
in a couple of computations below:
E
x
[∫ τ
0
e−αsf(X0s )ds
]
= g(x)− Ex [e−ατg(X0τ )] , (2.10)
for any stopping time τ under the assumption (2.7).
Now, let us simplify Jν by splitting the terms in (2.5). We can write the first terms (the term with the
integral) as
E
x
[∫ ∞
0
e−αsf(Xs)ds
]
= Ex
[∫ T1+∆
0
e−αsf(X0s )ds + e
−α(T1+∆)EXT1+∆
[∫ ∞
0
e−αsf(Xs)ds
]]
= g(x) − Ex[e−α(T1+∆)g(X0T1+∆)] + Ex
[
e−α(T1+∆)EXT1+∆
[∫ ∞
0
e−αsf(Xs)ds
]]
= g(x) − Ex[e−α(T1+∆)g(X(T1+∆)−)] + Ex
[
e−α(T1+∆)EXT1+∆
[∫ ∞
0
e−αsf(Xs)ds
]]
,
(2.11)
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while the second term can be developed as
E
x
[ ∑
Ti<∞
e−α(Ti+∆)K(X(T1+∆)−, XT1+∆)
]
= Ex
[
e−α(T1+∆)K(X(T1+∆)−, XT1+∆) + e
−α(T1+∆)
∞∑
i=2
e−α((Ti+∆)−(T1+∆))K(X(Ti+∆)−, XTi+∆)
]
= Ex
[
e−α(T1+∆)K(X(T1+∆)−, XT1+∆) + e
−α(T1+∆)E
x
[
∞∑
i=1
e−α((Ti+∆)◦θ(T1+∆))K(X(Ti+1+∆)−, XTi+1+∆)
∣∣∣∣FT1+∆
]]
= Ex
[
e−α(T1+∆)
{
K(X(T1+∆)−, XT1+∆) + E
XT1+∆
[
∞∑
i=1
e−α(Ti+∆)K(X(Ti+∆)−, XTi+∆)
]}]
where we used Ti+1 +∆ = (T1 +∆)+ (Ti +∆) ◦ θ(T1+∆) with the shift operator θ(·) in the second
equality. Here, we relied on Remark 2.1. Combining the two terms, we can write (2.5) as
Jν(x) = Ex
[
e−α(T1+∆)
{
K(X(Ti+∆)−,XTi+∆)− g(X(T1+∆)−) + Jν(XT1+∆)
}]
+ g(x).
We define
u , Jν − g. (2.12)
By adding and subtracting g(X(T1+∆)) to and from the first term we obtain
u(x) = Ex
[
e−α(T1+∆)K¯(X(T1+∆)−,XT1+∆) + u(XT1+∆)
]
(2.13)
in which
K¯(x, y) , K(x, y)− g(x) + g(y). (2.14)
Since T1− = τb with τb = inf{t ≥ 0 : X0t ≥ b} and the post intervention point by
XT1+∆ = Xτb+∆ = X(τb+∆)− − ξ1 , a. (2.15)
From Remark 2.1
u(x) = Ex
[
e−α(τb+∆)
{
K¯(Xτb+∆, a) + u(a)
}]
= Ex
[
E
x
[
e−α(τb+∆)
{
K¯(Xτb+∆, a) + u(a)
} ∣∣∣∣Fτb
]]
= Ex
[
e−ατbEXτb
[
e−α∆
{
K¯(X∆, a) + u(a)
}]]
. (2.16)
Evaluating at x = b, we obtain u(b) = Eb[e−α∆
{
K¯(X∆, a) + u(a)
}
]. Therefore, (2.13) becomes
u(x) = Ex
[
e−ατbu(Xτb)
]
.
Hence we have finally
u(x) =

u0(x) , E
x [e−ατbu(b)] , x ∈ (c, b),
E
x
[
e−α∆(K¯(X∆, a) + u0(a))
]
, x ∈ [b, d),
(2.17)
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where the second equality is obtained when we plug T1 = 0 in (2.13).
Using appropriate boundary conditions one can solve (A− α)u = 0 and obtain
E
x[e−ατr1{τr<τl}] =
ψ(l)ϕ(x) − ψ(x)ϕ(l)
ψ(l)ϕ(r) − ψ(r)ϕ(l) , E
x[e−ατr1{τl<τr}] =
ψ(x)ϕ(r) − ψ(r)ϕ(x)
ψ(l)ϕ(r) − ψ(r)ϕ(l) , (2.18)
for x ∈ [l, r] where τl , inf{t > 0;X0t = l} and τr , inf{t > 0;X0t = r} (see e.g. Dayanik and
Karatzas [12]). By defining
W , (u/ϕ) ◦ F−1, (2.19)
equation (2.17) becomes
W (F (x)) = W (F (c))
F (b) − F (x)
F (b) − F (c) +W (F (b))
F (x) − F (c)
F (b) − F (c) , x ∈ (c, b], (2.20)
We should note that F (c) , F (c+) = ψ(c+)/ϕ(c+) = 0 and
W (F (c)) = lc , lim sup
x↓c
K¯(x, a)+
ϕ(x)
(2.21)
for any a ∈ (c, d). For more detailed mathematical meaning of this value lc, we refer the reader to
Dayanik and Karatzas[12]. We have now established that W (F (x)) is a linear function in the trans-
formed “continuation region”.
2.2 An Algorithm to Compute the Value Function
Let us denote
r(x; a) , Ex[e−α∆K¯(X∆, a)] (2.22)
and transform this function by
R(·; a) , r(F
−1(·), a)
ϕ(F−1(·)) . (2.23)
First stage: For a given pair (a, b) ∈ (c, d) × (c, d) we can determine (2.17) from the linear charac-
terization (2.20). On (0, F (b)] we will find W (y) = ρy + lc (in which the slope is to be determined)
from
ρF (b) + lc = R(F (b), a) + e
−α∆(ρF (a) + lc)
ϕ(a)
ϕ(b)
. (2.24)
ρ can be determined as
ρ =
R(F (b; a)) + lc(e
−α∆ ϕ(a)
ϕ(b) − 1)
F (b)− e−α∆ ϕ(a)ϕ(b)F (a)
(2.25)
Sometimes we will refer to ρ as b → ρ(b), when it becomes necessary to emphasize the dependence on
b. The function u can be written as
u(x) =

u0(x) , ρψ(x) + lcϕ(x) x ≤ br(x, a) + e−α∆u0(a) x > b. (2.26)
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Note that (A − α)u(x) = 0 for x < b. Henceforth, to emphasize the dependence on the pair (a, b) we
will write ua,b(·) for the function u(·).
Second stage: Our purpose in this section is to determine
ua(x) , sup
b∈(c,d)
ua,b(x), x ∈ (c, d), (2.27)
to determine the constant b∗
ua(x) = ua,b
∗
(x), x ∈ (c, d), (2.28)
if there exists one.
Let us fix a and treat ρ as a function of b parametrized by a.
Lemma 2.1. Assume that the function R(·; a) defined in (2.23) is differentiable and that there exists a
constant b∗ ∈ (c, d) satisfying (2.28). Then b∗ satisfies the equation
ρF ′(b) =
∂
∂y
R(y; a)
∣∣∣∣
y=F (b)
F ′(b)− e−α∆(ρF (a) + lc)ϕ(a)ϕ
′(b)
ϕ(b)2
. (2.29)
in which ρ is given by (2.25).
Proof. From (2.26) it follows that the maximums of the functions b→ ua,b and b→ ρ(b) are attained at
the same point. Now taking the derivative of (2.24) and evaluating at ρb = 0 we obtain (2.29).
To find the optimal b (given a) we solve the non-linear and implicit equation (2.29). Under certain
assumptions on the function (r/ϕ) ◦ F−1, this equation has a unique solution as we show below.
Remark 2.2. On y ≥ F (b), the function W is given by
W (y) = e−α∆(ρF (a) + lc)
ϕ(a)
ϕ(F−1(y))
+R(y; a). (2.30)
The right derivative of W at F (b) is given by
W ′(F (b)) = −e−α∆(ρF (a) + lc) ϕ(a)
ϕ(b)2
ϕ′(b)
F ′(b)
+
∂
∂y
R(y; a)
∣∣∣∣
y=F (b)
. (2.31)
Therefore, (2.29) implies that the left and the right derivative of W (recall that W (y) = ρy + lc for
y < F (b)) at F (b) are equal (smooth fit).
Let us define
ua(x) , sup
b∈(c,d)
E
x
[
e−ατbEXτb
[
e−α∆
{
K¯(X∆, a) + ua(a)
}]]
. (2.32)
The next lemma shows that (2.32) is well-defined. Below we show that under certain assumptions on
(r/ϕ) ◦ F−1 this function is equal to ua.
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Lemma 2.2. Assume that
sup
x∈(c,d)
E
x[K¯(X∆, a)] > 0 (2.33)
for some a ∈ (c, d). Let us introduce a family of value functions parameterized by γ ∈ R as
V γa (x) , sup
τ∈S
E
x
[
e−α(τ+∆)
{
K¯(X0τ+∆, a) + γ
}]
= sup
τ∈S
E
x
[
e−ατEX
0
τ
[
e−α∆
{
K¯(X0∆, a) + γ
}] ]
,
(2.34)
here S is the set of all stopping times of the filtration natural filtration of X0. Then there exists a unique
γ∗ such that V γ
∗
a (a) = γ∗.
Proof. Let us denote
W γa (F (x)) ,
V γa (x)
ϕ(x)
, (2.35)
Consider the function γ → V γa (a). Our aim is to show that there exists a fixed point to this function.
Let us consider V 0a (a) first. Because (2.33) is satisfied we have that V 0a (a) > 0. As γ increases, V γ(a)
increases monotonically, by the right hand side of (2.34). Now, Lemma 5.1 implies that for γ1 > γ2 ≥ 0,
V γ1a (x)− V γ2a (x) ≤ γ1 − γ2 (2.36)
for any x ∈ R+. Note that W γa (F (a)) ≥ R(F (a), a) + e
−α∆γ
ϕ(a) for all γ. However, since V has less than
linear growth in γ as demonstrated by (2.36) we can see that there is a certain γ′ large enough such that
W γa (F (a)) = R(F (a), a) +
e−α∆γ
ϕ(a) for γ ≥ γ
′
. This implies however
ϕ(a)W γ
′
a (F (a)) = ϕ(a)R(F (a), a) + e
−α∆γ′
⇔ V γ′a (a) = r(a, a) + e−α∆γ′ < γ′
where the inequality is due to the assumption (2.8). For this γ′ , we have V γ
′
a (a) < γ
′
.
Since γ → V γa is continuous, which follows from the fact that this function is convex, and increasing,
V 0a > 0 and V
γ
′
a (a) < γ
′ implies that γ → V γa crosses the line γ → γ.
Lemma 2.3. Assume that
r(x, a) is lower semi-continuous. (2.37)
Let us define Rγ(·; a) , rγ(F−1(·),a)
ϕ(F−1(·)) where
rγ(x, a) , Ex[e−α∆(K¯(X∆, a) + γ)]. (2.38)
Then (2.35) is the smallest non-negative concave majorant of Rγ that passes through (F (c+), lc).
Proof. See for e.g. Dynkin [14] and Dayanik and Karatzas [12].
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Lemma 2.4. Assume that (2.33) and (2.37) hold. Then ua/ϕ is F−concave, i.e., α−excessive.1
Proof. This follows from Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3. For the equivalence of α-excessivity and F−concavity
see e.g. Theorem 12.4 in [14] and also [12]. This fact can be observed from (5.8).
Lemma 2.5. Assume that (2.33) and (2.37) hold. Then
ua(x) ≤ ua(x), x ∈ (c, d). (2.39)
Proof. It follows from Lemma 2.4 that ua is α-excessive. Also, observe from (2.32) that
ua(x) ≥ r(x; a) + e−α∆ua(a), (2.40)
where r(x, a) is as in (2.37). Let ν = {T1, T2, ..., Ti, ...; ξ1, ξ2, ..., ξi, ...} be an admissible control and let
T0 = 0. Without loss of generality we will assume that r(b; a) > 0, because otherwise the corresponding
strategy will have a lower value function Jν(x) associated to it. Since ua is α− excessive,
ua(x) ≥ Ex
[
e−αT1ua(XT1)
]
, and Ex
[
e−α(Ti+∆)ua(X(Ti+∆))
]
− Ex [e−αTi+1ua(XTi+1)] ≥ 0,
(2.41)
for all i = 1, ..., N − 1. Then
ua(x) ≥ Ex
[
e−αT1ua(XT1)
]
+
N−1∑
i=1
E
x
[
e−αTi+1ua(XTi+1)
]− Ex [e−α(Ti+∆)ua(X(Ti+∆))]
= Ex
[
e−αTNua(XTN )
]
+
N−1∑
i=1
E
x
[
e−αTiua(XTi)
]− Ex [e−α(Ti+∆)ua(X(Ti+∆))]
≥
N−1∑
i=1
E
x
[
e−αTir(XTi , a)
]
,
(2.42)
in which the inequality follows from (2.40) and the fact that ua is non-negative. Now, using the monotone
convergence theorem
ua(x) ≥ Ex
[ ∞∑
i=1
e−αTir(XTi , a)
]
= Ex
[ ∞∑
i=1
e−α(Ti+∆)EXTi
[
K¯(X∆, a)
]]
= Ex
[ ∞∑
i=1
e−α(Ti+∆)EXTi [K(X∆, a)− g(X∆) + g(a)]
]
= Ex
[ ∞∑
i=1
e−α(Ti+∆)K(X(Ti+∆)−,XTi+∆)
]
+ Ex
[ ∞∑
i=1
e−α(Ti+∆)(−g(X(Ti+∆)−) + g(X(Ti+∆)))
]
= Ex
[ ∞∑
i=1
e−α(Ti+∆)K(X(Ti+∆)−,XTi+∆)
]
+ Ex
[∫ ∞
0
e−αsf(Xs)ds
]
− g(x) = ua,b(x).
(2.43)
1A function f is called α-excessive function of X0 if for any stopping time τ of the natural filtration of X0 and x ∈ (c, d),
f(x) ≥ Ex
ˆ
e−ατf(X0τ )
˜
, see for e.g. [10] and [14] for more details.
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The third inequality follows from Remark 2.1). The fourth inequality can be derived from (2.11). The
last equality follows from (2.12). Now taking to supremum over b, we obtain (2.39).
Lemma 2.6. Assume that (2.33) and (2.37) hold and that the function x → R(x; a) defined in (2.22) is
concave and increasing on (a′, d) for some a′ ∈ (a, d) and that
lim
x→F (d)
R(x; a) =∞. (2.44)
Then ua(x) = ua,b
∗
(x) for a unique b∗ ∈ (c, d). Hence from Lemma 2.5 it follows that ua(x) = ua(x) =
ua,b
∗
(x), x ∈ (c, d).
Proof. Since R is concave, Rγ in (2.38) is also concave on (a′, d). The assumption in (2.44) implies that
the smallest concave majorant W γa in (2.35) is linear on (F (c), F (bγ )) for a unique bγ ∈ (c, d) and is
tangential to Rγ(·, a) at F (bγ) and coincides with Rγ(·, a) on [F (bγ), F (d)). Together with Lemma 2.2
this implies that there exists a unique γ∗ such that equations (2.30) and (2.31) are satisfied when W is
replaced by W γ
∗
a and b is replaced by bγ
∗
. Note that W γ
∗
a corresponds to a strategy (a, bγ
∗
). That is,
if we start with ua,bγ
∗
and transform it via (2.19) we get W γ∗a . On the other hand, using (2.35) with by
substituting γ = γ∗ we have that ua(x) = ϕ(x)W γ
∗
a (F (x)), x ∈ (c, d). This let’s us conclude that
ua,b
γ∗
= ua(x), x ∈ (c, d). We see that the unique b∗ in the claim of the proposition is bγ∗ .
Proposition 2.7. Assume that the hypotheses of Lemma 2.6 are satisfied. Then there exists a unique
solution to (2.29). If b∗ is the unique solution of (2.29), then ua(x) = ua,b∗(x).
Proof. In the proof of Lemma 2.6, we have seen that there exists a unique b∗ such that (2.30) and (2.31)
are satisfied. Using Remark 2.2, we conclude that b∗ is the unique solution of (2.29).
Note that when the assumptions of Proposition 2.7 hold, the optimal threshold strategy is described by
a single open interval in the state space of the controlled process. The conditions for the existence and
uniqueness of the optimal interval are specified, essentially by the conditions on total reward function
K¯(x, y) associated with one intervention from x to y (see (2.14), (2.23) ) and drift and volatility of the
underlying diffusion as the function F depends on them that appears in (2.23) depends on them.
Third stage: Now, we let a ∈ (c, d) vary and choose a∗ that maximizes ρ(a) and also find b∗ = b(a∗).
Finally, we obtain the value function given in (2.6) by v(x) = u(x) + g(x).
2.3 Example: Optimal Exchange Rate Intervention When There is Delay
To illustrate the procedure of solving impulse control problems with delay, we take an example from
Mundaca and Øksendal [18] (also see Øksendal [19]) that considers the following foreign exchange rate
intervention problem:
JνD(x) , E
x
[∫ ∞
0
e−αsX2s ds+
∞∑
i
e−α(Ti+∆)(c+ λ|ξi|)
]
(2.45)
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where X0t = x + Bt, in which B is a standard Brownian motion. Here, the superscript 0 is to indicate
that the dynamics in consideration are of the uncontrolled state variable. In (2.45), c > 0 and λ ≥ 0
are constants representing the cost of making an intervention. The problem without delays are solved
by [19] through quasi-variational inequalities and by [11] using a direct characterization of the value
function. In this problem, the Brownian motion represents the exchange rate of currency and the impulse
control represents the interventions the central bank makes in order to keep the exchange rate in a given
target window. At time Ti, such that XTi− = b, the central bank makes a commitment to reduce the
exchange rate from b to a < b, which is implemented ∆ units of time later. During the time interval
(Ti, Ti +∆] the central bank does not make any other interventions. ∆ units later if the exchange rate is
still greater than a, then the central bank reduces the exchange rate from X(Ti+∆)− to a and pays a cost
of c + λ(X(Ti+∆)− − a). On the other hand, if ∆ units of time later if the exchange rate is less than a,
the central bank chooses increases the exchange rate to a at a cost of c + λ(a − X(Ti+∆)−). This is a
one-sided impulse control problem, in the sense that a control is triggered only if Xt > b and there has
not been any previous action in the interval (t−∆, t).
The problem is to minimize the expected total discounted cost over all threshold strategies.
vD(x) , inf
ν
JνD(x). (2.46)
A similar version of this problem is analyzed by Øksendal and Sulem [22], in which they take the controls
ξi ∈ FTi for all i. (This introduces path dependence since the value of XTi+∆ is partially determined by
FTi .)
Instead of solving a minimization problem of (2.46), we will solve
v(x) = sup
ν
E
x
[∫ ∞
0
e−αs(−X2s )ds −
∞∑
i
e−α(Ti+∆)(c+ λ|ξi|)
]
.
and recover the value function by vD(x) = −v(x). (Here, the supremum is taken over all the threshold
strategies.) The continuous cost rate is f(x) = −x2 and the intervention cost is K(x, y) = −c−λ|x−y|
in our terminology. By solving the equation (A − α)v(x) = 12v
′′
(x) − αv(x) = 0, we find that
ψ(x) = ex
√
2α and ϕ(x) = e−x
√
2α
. Hence F (x) = e2x
√
2α and F−1(x) = log x
2
√
2α
. Using Fubini’s
theorem we can calculate g(x) explicitly as:
g(x) = −Ex
∫ ∞
0
e−αs(x+Bs)2ds = −
(
x2
α
+
1
α2
)
.
We shall follow the procedure described in the last section: Let us fix a > 0 and consider
r(x, a) = Ex[e−α∆K¯(X∆, a)] = Ex
[
e−α∆
(
− c− λ|X∆ − a|+ g(a) − g(X∆)
)]
(2.47)
= Ex
[
e−α∆
(
−c− λ|x+B∆ − a| −
(
a2
α
+
1
α2
)
+
(
(x+B∆)
2
α
+
1
α2
))]
= e−α∆
(
−c− λ
(
2∆ exp
(
−(a− x)
2
4∆2
)
+ (a− x)
(
−1 + 2N
(
a− x
∆
)))
+
x2 − a2 +∆
α
)
.
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The left boundary −∞ is natural for a Brownian motion and, for any a > 0,
l−∞ = lim sup
x↓−∞
r(x, a)+
ϕ(x)
= 0.
It follows that R(y) passes through (F (−∞), l−∞) = (0, 0). (See Dayanik and Karatzas[12] Proposition
5.12.)
Proposition 2.8. For the function r in (2.47), there exists a unique solution to (2.29) for a fixed a.
Proof. See Appendix.
Using the algorithm we described in Section 2.2 we find the optimal (a∗, b∗, ρ∗). Going back to the
original space we get
V (x) = sup
a,b∈R
u(x) = ϕ(x)W ∗(F (x)) = ϕ(x)(β∗)F (x) = ρ∗ex
√
2α.
on x ∈ (−∞, b∗]. To get v(x) = supν Jν(x), we add back g(x),
v(x) = V (x) + g(x) = ρ∗ex
√
2α −
(
x2
α
+
1
α2
)
.
Finally, flipping the sign we obtain the optimal cost function as
vD(x) =

vˆo(x) ,
(
x2
α +
1
α2
)
− ρ∗ex
√
2α, 0 ≤ x ≤ b∗,
−e−α∆ρ∗ea∗
√
2α − r(x; a∗) + x2α + 1α2 , b∗ ≤ x.
(2.48)
Figure 1 is obtained when the parameters are chosen to be (c, λ, α,∆) = (150, 50, 0.2, 1.0). We found
the solution triplet to be (a∗, b∗, ρ∗) = (5.066, 12.1756, 0.042423). The optimal cost function without
delay, for the same parameters, has the solution triplet (a0, b0, ρ0) = (5.07723, 12.2611, 0.0492262).
The continuation region shifts to the left with delay (it shrinks from (−∞, 12.2611) to (−∞, 12.1756)),
and the central bank acts more aggressively when it encounters delays (see Figure 1 - (c)).
3 Firing Costs and Labor Demand: Optimal Band Strategies
In this section, we will improve on the techniques of the previous section in order to study an impulse
control corresponding to band policies when there are implementation delays. In particular, we will
concentrate our attention on a specific example, which is of practical interest. We will find optimal
hiring and firing decisions of a firm that faces stochastic demand and has to conform to regulatory delays
when it is firing employees.
Recently, General Motors Corporation (GM) has decided to lay off 25,000 of its work force to cut
back on its production and administrative costs. However “GM’s UAW (United Auto Workers) contract
essentially forces it to pay union employees during the life of the contract even if hourly workers are laid
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Figure 1: (a) The optimal cost function vD(x). The dotted line and the solid line fit each other continuously at
b∗ = 12.1756. (b) The derivative of vD(x), showing that the smooth-fit principle holds at b∗. (c) Comparison
of vD(x) with the cost function without delay v0(x). Note that vD majorizes v0. (d) Plot of the difference of
vD(x) − v0(x).
off and their plants are closed. But those protections only run through September 2007, when the current
four-year pact with the union ends. GM spokesman Ed Snyder said the automaker has yet to reach any
agreement with the UAW yet on the nature or the manner of the work force reduction.” 2 This is a typical
example of a firing cost and implementation delay a corporation faces when the workers are unionized.
Another example of firing delay caused by government regulations in Europe (see e.g. [9]).
Bentolila and Bertola [9] address the issue of costly hiring and firing and its effects on unemployment
rate in Europe using singular stochastic control. Here, we are solving an impulse control problem since
we are also taking fixed cost of labor adjustments into account. But our main purpose is to measure
the effects on firing delay in decisions of firms. As we shall see, it turns out that the controlled state
variable is not Markov, therefore we will focus our attention completely on the band policies (which
we will define shortly) rather than trying to find the best impulse control policy. Our method of solving
impulse control problem differs from its counterparts that use quasi-variational inequalities since we
give a direct characterization of the value function as a linear function in the continuation region without
having to guess the form of the solution and without having to prove that the conjectured solution satisfies
conditions of a verification lemma.
2Source: June 7, 2005 CNN Money, “GM to cut 25,000 jobs” by Chris Isidore, http://money.cnn.com/2005/06/07/
news/fortune500/gm closings/
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3.1 Problem setup
As in [9]3, we will consider a firm with a linear production technology. In particular the quantity sold is
Qt = ALt, A ∈ R+, in which Lt is the labor at time t. The selling price at time t, Pt, of the product is
determined from
Qt = ZtP
1
µ−1
t , µ ∈ (0, 1) (3.1)
in which Zt indexes the position of the direct demand curve whose dynamics follow
dZt = Ztbdt+ ZtσtdWt (3.2)
with a constant b ∈ R+. In equation (3.1) the quantity 1 − µ is the firm’s monopoly power. Let us
denote the filtration generated by the demand process Z by F , (Ft)t≥0. We will make the following
assumption to guarantee that (3.2) has a unique strong solution. We assume that σ is bounded and adapted
to the filtration of the Brownian motion W .
In our framework, if the firm produces excess products because of the excess labor, the products
produced are still all sold but at a cheaper price. The firm pays a wage, w, to its workers, therefore the
net rate of profit that the firm makes at time t is given by
QtPt − wLt = Z1−µt (ALt)µ − wLt.
When the workers quit voluntarily, the firm bears no firing costs and we assume that the workers quit at
rate δ, that is, without any intervention from the management the labor force follows the dynamics
dL0t = −δL0t dt. (3.3)
Here, as in the previous section, the superscript 0 indicates that there are no controls applied. The firm
makes commitments to change its labor force at times {Si}i∈N and {Ti}i∈N. At time Si the firm makes
a commitment to increase its labor force (which is immediately implemented), and at time Ti it makes
a commitment to decrease its labor force, which is implemented ∆ units of time later. During the time
interval (Ti, Ti + ∆] the firm makes no commitments to change its labor force. Note that although at
time Ti the firm decided to decrease its labor force, the labor force itself might move to very low levels
following the dynamics (3.3), therefore at time Ti + ∆ the firm may end up hiring to move keep the
production level up. However, if the labor force level is still very high at time (Ti +∆)−, then the firm
ends up firing. Here, ∆ represents the regulatory delays a firm faces when it is cutting off its work force.
The labor adjustments come at a cost: At time Si the firm increases the labor by ζi(≥ 0) ∈ FSi (Here,
for the sake of brevity we are taking the σ-algebras as a collection of mappings.) to LSi− + ζi, then the
associated cost is
c1ζi + c2LSi−.
3The set up of Bentolila and Bertola [9] was brought to our attention by Keppo and Maull. In the INFORMS Annual
Meeting in 2004, Keppo and Maull presented their partial results on the hiring and firing decisions of firms which they obtained
by solving quasi-variational inequalities.
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At time Ti, the firm makes a commitment to decrease the labor at time Ti +∆. If it ends up decreasing
the labor force by ηi(≥ 0) ∈ FTi+∆ to LTi+∆ = L(Ti+∆)−− ηi, then the associated cost is quantified as
c3ηi + c4L(Ti+∆)−,
which depends on the amount of labor force to be fired and the level of the total labor force as well. The
latter component of costs is based on the following observations: When a corporation decides who to be
fired or which division to be restructured, administrative costs will become larger in proportion to the
size of the total labor force since the firm’s operations are closely knitted among various divisions.
On the other hand as we discussed above if the labor force itself moves to very low levels itself during
the ∆ units of time, at time Ti+∆ the firm may end up hiring (in this case ηi ≤ 0) to keep the production
up at the cost of
c1|ηi|+ c2L(Ti+∆)−
for some positive constants c1, c2, c3, c4 and ∆ ≥ 0. This cost becomes negligible as ∆ becomes small
because in that case the work force does not change much by itself. So the controls of the firm are of the
form
ν = (S1, S2, · · · ; ζ1, ζ2, · · · ;T1, T2, · · · ; η1, η2, · · · ),
where 0 ≤ S1 < S2 < · · · and 0 ≤ T1 < T2 < · · · are two increasing sequences of stopping times
of the filtration F . Ti+1 − Ti ≥ ∆ and for any i there exists no j such that Ti ≤ Sj ≤ Ti+∆. The
magnitudes of the impulses satisfy ζi(≥ 0) ∈ FSi and ηi(∈ R) ∈ FTi+∆ for all i. We call these type of
controls admissible and we will denote the set of all admissible controls by V . To each control ν ∈ A
we associate a profit function of the form
Jν(z, l) , E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
Z1−µt (ALt)
µ − wLt
)
dt−
∑
i
e−rSi (c1ζi + c2LSi−)
−
∑
j
e−r(Tj+∆)
((
c3ηj + c4L(Tj+∆)−
)
1{ηj>0} +
(
c1ηj + c2L(Tj+∆)−
)
1{ηj<0}
) ]
,
(3.4)
which incorporates the profit and cost structure we described so far. Here r > b is a subjective rate of
return that the firm uses to discount its future profits. In fact if r < b, then taking no action is optimal as
we will point out below. Under the measure P, we have that L0 = l and Z0 = z almost surely.
The objective of the company is then to maximize its profits by choosing the best possible strategy ν∗
such that
v(z, l) , sup
v∈V
Jν(z, l) = Jν
∗
(z, l), (3.5)
if the optimal strategy ν∗ exists. Hereafter, we will refer to v as the value function.
It looks as if the control problem defined in (3.5) involves two state variables, namely the demand
Z and the labor force L. Recall that we have no control over the demand Z but we can control the
labor force L by making hires and fires. But the only source of randomness is the demand process. In
the sequel we will show that the optimal control problem (3.5) involves only one state variable. On
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denoting ξt , Lt/Zt, t ≥ 0 and the absolute changes in labor per unit of demand by βi , ζi/ZSi and
αi , ηi/ZTi+∆ ∈ FTi+∆, we can write the the profit function Jν as
Jν(z, l) = E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rtZt ((Aξt)µ − wξt) dt−
∑
i
e−rSiZSi−(c1βi + c2ξSi−)
∑
j
e−r(Tj+∆)
(
(c3ZTj αj + c4ZTj+∆ ξ(Tj+∆)−)1{αj>0} + (c1ZTj αj + c2ZTj+∆ ξ(Tj+∆)−)1{αj<0}
) ]
.
(3.6)
Let us introduce a new probability measure P0 by
dP0
dP
∣∣∣∣
Ft
= Z˜t, where Z˜t = exp
(∫ t
0
σsdWs − 1
2
∫ t
0
σ2sds
)
(3.7)
for every 0 ≤ t <∞. Using the representation of the profit function Jν , we can write it as
Jν(z, l) = zIν
(z
l
)
, (3.8)
in which
Iν(ξ) , Eξ0
[ ∫ ∞
0
e(b−r)tz ((Aξt)µ − wξt) dt−
∑
i
e(b−r)Si(c1βi + c2ξSi−)
−
∑
j
e(b−r)(Tj+∆)
(
(c3αj + c4ξ(Tj+∆)−)1{αj>0} + (c1αj + c2ξ(Tj+∆)−)1{αj<0}
)]
,
(3.9)
where Eξ is the expectation under P0 given that ξ0 = ξ. Here, with slight abuse of notation, on the
right-hand-side of (3.8), we denoted
ν = (S1, S2, · · · ;β1, β2, · · · ;T1, T2, · · · ;α1, α2, · · · ),
is a control that is applied to the process ξ. The controls here are such that βi(≥ 0) ∈ FSi and αi(∈ R) ∈
FTi+∆. Again as before {Sn}n∈N and {Tn}n∈N are two increasing sequence of stopping times. We also
assume that Ti+1 − Ti ≥ ∆ ≥ 0 and that for any i there exists no j such that Ti ≤ Sj ≤ Ti+∆. With
another slight abuse of notation we will denote the admissible set of controls we described here also by
V . As a result of the developments in the last part of this section we see that the process Lt/Zt is the
sufficient statistic of the problem in (3.5). In fact we can write the value function as
v(z, l) = zY
(z
l
)
, where Y (ξ) , sup
ν∈V
Iν(ξ). (3.10)
Under the measure Pξ0 the dynamics of the process, ξt when there are no impulses applied follows
ξ0t = ξ exp
(
−(b+ δ)t−
∫ t
0
σsdBs − 1
2
∫ t
0
σ2sds
)
, (3.11)
where B is a Wiener process under measure P0. Here, as before, the superscript 0 indicates that there are
no controls/impulses applied.
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3.2 Solution
Although the controlled process ξ is not a Markov process, because depending on whether the process
reaches a point during the interval (Ti, Ti + ∆) or not, that point has different roles. That is, how the
process reaches to a particular point (path information) affects how the process will continue from this
point. However, the process regenerates at times {Ti + ∆}i∈N and the value of the process at time
T ∈ (Ti, Ti+∆), XT , depends on the information up to Ti, FTi , only through the value of the process at
time Ti, XTi . Therefore, as we did in Section 2.1, assuming there is no history prior to time 0, i.e. F0 is
a trivial sigma-algebra, we can develop
Iν(ξ) = Eξ0
[
1{T1<S1}e
(b−r)(T1+∆) (C1(ξ(T1+∆)−, ξT1+∆)− g(ξ(T1+∆)−) + Iν(ξT1+∆))
+ 1{T1>S1}e
(b−r)S1 (C2(ξS1−, ξS1)− g(ξS1−) + Iν(ξS1))
]
,
(3.12)
where C2(x, y) , −c1(y − x)1{y>x} − c2x, and,
C1(x, y) , −(c3(x− y) + c4x)1{x>y} +C2(x, y)1{y>x}
(3.13)
g(ξ) , E0
[∫ ∞
0
e(b−r)t
(
(Aξ0t )
µ − wξ0t
)
dt
]
. (3.14)
On denoting u(ξ) , I ν˜(ξ)− g(ξ), we can write
u(ξ) = Eξ0
[
1{T1<S1}e
(b−r)(T1+∆) (C¯1(ξ(T1+∆)−, ξT1+∆) + u(ξT1+∆))]
+ Eξ0
[
1{T1>S1}e
(b−r)S1 (C¯2(ξS1−, ξS1) + u(ξS1))] , (3.15)
in which
C¯1(x, y) , C1(x, y) − g(x) + g(y) and C¯2(x, y) , C2(x, y)− g(x) + g(y). (3.16)
In the rest of this section, we will analyze the following double sided threshold strategy (band policy)
of the following form: 1) Whenever the marginal revenue product of labor hits level d, the firm makes
a commitment to bring the marginal revenue product of labor to c < d. This may be achieved by firing
employees if marginal revenue product of labor is still greater than c after the delay. However, it is
possible that after the delay the marginal revenue product of labor will be less than c. In this case, the
firm makes hires. 2) Whenever the marginal revenue product of labor hits level p the firm increases it to
q > p (by hiring new employees). We will characterize the value function corresponding to an arbitrary
band policy.
For a band policy we described above S1 = τp and T1 = τd, and
ξT1+∆ = ξ(τb+∆)− − α1 = c and ξS1 = ξS1− + β1 = q.
Here, for any x ∈ R+, τx , inf{t ≥ 0 : ξ0t = x}. Let us introduce
u0(ξ) , E
ξ
0[e
(b−r)τd1{τd<τp}u(d)] + E
ξ
0[e
(b−r)τp1{τd>τp}u(p)], (3.17)
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in which
u(d) = Ed0
[
e(b−r)∆(C¯1(ξ0∆−, c) + u(c))
]
and u(p) = C¯2(p, q) + u(q). (3.18)
From (3.15)-(3.18) it can be seen that
u(ξ) =


C¯2(ξ, q) + u0(q), ξ ≤ p;
u0(ξ), p ≤ ξ ≤ d;
r(ξ, c) + e(b−r)∆u0(c), ξ ≥ d.
(3.19)
in which
r(ξ, c) , Eξ0
[
e(b−r)∆C¯1(ξ0∆−, c)
]
. (3.20)
Let us denote the fundamental solutions of (A + (b − r))f = 0, by ψ (increasing) and ϕ (decreasing),
and introduce F , ψ/ϕ. Using (2.18), on the interval (p, d) we can write u as
u(ξ)
ϕ(ξ)
=
u(d)
ϕ(d)
(F (ξ) − F (p))
(F (d)− F (p)) +
u(p)
ϕ(p)
(F (d)− F (ξ))
(F (d) − F (p)) , ξ ∈ (p, d). (3.21)
Then, W , uϕ ◦ F−1, satisfies
W (y) = W (F (d))
y − F (p)
F (d) − F (p) +W (F (p))
(F (d) − y)
(F (d) − F (p)) , y ∈ [F (p), F (d)]. (3.22)
Using the linear characterization (in the continuation region) of the band policies in (3.22), the following
algorithm first determines the function u for an arbitrary band policy and goes onto finding the best band
policy.
First, let us define
R1(x; c) ,
r(·, c)
ϕ(·) ◦ F
−1(x) and R2(x; q) ,
C¯2(·, q)
ϕ(·) ◦ F
−1(x). (3.23)
Algorithm:
1. For a given band policy which is characterized by the quadruplet (p, q, c, d) such that p < q < c <
d, we can find the value function u in (3.19) using the linear characterization in (3.22). On [F(p),
F(d)] we will find W (y) = ρy + τ (in which the slope ρ and the intercept τ are to be determined)
from
e(b−r)∆(ρF (c) + τ)
ϕ(c)
ϕ(d)
+R1(F (d); c) = ρF (d) + τ,
(ρF (q) + τ)
ϕ(q)
ϕ(p)
+R2(F (p); q) = ρF (p) + τ.
(3.24)
ρ and τ are determined as
ρ =
R2(F (p);q)
1−ϕ(q)/ϕ(p)
(
e(b−r)∆ ϕ(c)ϕ(d) − 1
)
+R1(F (d); c)
F (d) − e(b−r)∆ ϕ(c)ϕ(d)F (c) + ϕ(q)/ϕ(p) F (q)−F (p)1−ϕ(q)/ϕ(p)
(
1− e(b−r)∆ ϕ(c)ϕ(d)
) ,
τ =
ρ
(
ϕ(q)
ϕ(p)F (q)− F (p)
)
+R2(F (p; q))
1− ϕ(q)ϕ(p)
.
(3.25)
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Now u can be written as
u(ξ) =


u0(q) + r2(ξ, q), x ≤ p,
u0(ξ) , ρψ(ξ) + τϕ(ξ), p ≤ x ≤ d,
e(b−r)∆u0(c) + r1(ξ, c), x ≥ d.
(3.26)
From this last expression, we observe that (A+ (b− r))u(ξ) = 0 for ξ ∈ (p, d).
2. Note that ρ and τ are functions of (p, d) parametrized by (q, c). We will find an optimal pair (p, d)
given (q, c) by equating the gradient of the function (ρ, τ) with respect to (p, d) to be zero. Now,
differentiating the first equation in (3.24) with respect to d, and the second with respect to p, and
evaluating them at τd = ρd = τp = ρp = 0 we obtain
− (ρF (q) + τ) ϕ(q)
ϕ(p)2
ϕ′(p)− ρF ′(p) + ∂
∂y
R2(y; q)
∣∣∣∣
y=F (p)
F ′(p) = 0
− e(b−r)∆(ρF (c) + τ) ϕ(c)
ϕ(d)2
ϕ′(d)− ρF ′(d) + ∂
∂y
R1(y; c)
∣∣∣∣
y=F (d)
F ′(d) = 0,
(3.27)
in which ρ and τ are given by (3.25). To find the optimal (p, d) (given (c, q)) we solve the non-
linear and implicit system of equations in (3.27).
Remark 3.1. On [F (0), F (p)] the function W is given by
W (x) =
(
(ρF (q) + τ)
ϕ(q)
ϕ(F−1(x))
)
+R2(x; q), (3.28)
and its left derivative at F(p), W ′(F (p)−), is given by
W ′(F (p)−) = −(ρF (q) + τ) ϕ(q)
ϕ(p)2
ϕ′(p)
F ′(p)
+
∂
∂y
R2(y; q)
∣∣∣∣
y=F (p)
(3.29)
Therefore, the equation in (3.27) in fact implies that the left and the right derivative of W at F (p)
are equal (smooth fit). (Recall that W (x) = ρx + τy on [F (p), F (d)].) Similarly, the second
equation in (3.27) implies that the left and the right derivative of W at F (d) are equal. This can
be also expressed as: ”R2 shifted by an appropriate amount is tangential to the line l(y) = ρy+τ”
at F (p).
3. Next, we vary q and c to find the best band policy. Such a search can easily carried out in Mathe-
matica.
To obtain an explicit expression for g in (3.14) and r in (3.20) we make the following assumption. We
will assume that σt = σ > 0 (a constant) in (3.2). Now, we can obtain g in (3.14) (see Appendix)
explicitly as
g(ξ) =
Aµ
r − b+ (b+ δ)µ + 12σ2µ− 12σ2µ2
ξµ − w
r + δ
ξ ≡ k1ξµ + k2ξ. (3.30)
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Note that if r < b, then g(ξ) = ∞, which implies that taking no action is optimal. The assumption
in Proposition 3.1 that max(c1 − c2, c3 + c4) < |k2| is for technical reasons, however it is not very
restrictive. k2 denotes the present value of the total wage that a firm pays per unit of marginal revenue
product of labor and it should be greater than costs associated with one time hiring or firing of one unit
of marginal revenue product of labor. Using (3.30) we can also calculate r in (3.20) explicitly as (see
Appendix)
r(ξ, c) = e(b−r)∆
[
− (c3 + c4)e−(b+δ)∆ξN(d1) + (c1 − c2)e−(b+δ)∆ξN(−d1)
+ c3cN(d2)− c1cN(−d2)− k1 exp (ǫ) ξµ − k2e−(b+δ)∆ξ + k1cµ + k2c
] (3.31)
in which
d1 ,
1
σ
√
∆
log
(
ξ
c
)
+
(
1
2
σ2 − (b+ δ)
) √
∆
σ
,
d2 ,
1
σ
√
∆
log
(
ξ
c
)
−
(
1
2
σ2 + (b+ δ)
) √
∆
σ
,
ǫ , −
(
b+ δ +
1
2
σ2(1− µ)
)
µ∆.
(3.32)
Here the function x → N(x), x ∈ R, denotes the cumulative distribution function of an N(0, 1)
(standard Gaussian) random variable. The infinitesimal generator A of the process ξ is Au(x) ,
(σ2/2)x2u′′(x) − (b+ δ)xu′(x), acting on smooth test functions u(·). Therefore the fundamental solu-
tions of the equation (A+ (b− r))u = 0 are
ψ(x) , xβ1 , ϕ , xβ2 , (3.33)
in which β1 > 1 and β2 < 0 are the roots of the following quadratic equation (in terms of β)
1
2
σ2β2 −
(
1
2
σ2 + (b+ δ)
)
β + b− r = 0. (3.34)
The next proposition justifies the second stage of our algorithm.
Proposition 3.1. For a given (q, c) ∈ R2, such that (c1q − (k1qµ + k2q)) < 0 there exits a unique
solution (p∗, d∗) to the system of equations (3.27) if we further assume that max(c1−c2, c3+c4) < |k2|.
Moreover, up∗,q,c,d∗(x) = sup0<p<d up,q,c,s(x), x ≥ 0.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 2.8. Also, see the remark below.
Remark 3.2. The proof of Proposition 3.1 only relies on the following properties of the functions R1 and
R2 defined in (3.23): 1) There exists a point j ∈ (0,∞) such that y → R1(y; c) is concave and increasing
on (j,∞); 2) limy→∞R1(y; c) =∞; 3) The function y → R2(y, q) is increasing and concave on (0, t)
for some t < F (q) and decreasing on (t,∞); 4) Both y → R1(y; c) and y → R2(y, q) are differentiable.
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Our results in this section can be generalized to the two-sided control of any one-dimensional diffusion
and penalty functions satisfying the conditions in Remark 3.2 are satisfied. It is worth pointing out
that Weeransinghe [25] has studied the two-sided bounded variation control within the framework of
singular stochastic control of linear diffusions for a large class of cost functions by using of the functional
relationship between the value function of optimal stopping and that of singular stochastic control (see
e.g. Karatzas and Shreve [16]).
3.3 Numerical Example
In this section, we will give a numerical example for the labor problem with and without delay. We select
the parameters as b = 0.03, r = 0.06, µ = 0.75, σ = 0.35, δ = 0.1, A = 5, w = 2,∆ = 0.5, c1 = 0.05,
c2 = 0.1, c3 = 2 and c4 = 1. The results we obtain are summarized in the following table:
ρ τ p q c d
∆ = 0 0.0002003 38.1633 1.0664 2.125 7.240 35.728
∆ = 0.5 0.0001725 38.1597 1.0661 2.100 7.120 36.640
Both the slope ρ and the intercept τ are greater in the no-delay case and therefore, the value function
corresponding to no-delay problem vN (x) will dominate that to delay problem vD(x). On the right
boundary, we have (7.240, 35.728) ⊂ (7.120, 36.640) and on the left boundary (c, d) pair has shifted
to the left with delay. As a result, the continuation region (p, d) has expanded with delay: CN ,
(1.0664, 35.728) ⊂ (1.0661, 36.640) , CD. An explanations for this phenomenon can be made through
the relative size of costs of firing and hiring, the size of delay parameter, the shape of g function, etc.
In our example, the firing cost is relatively larger than hiring cost, the penalty of firing becomes smaller
with delay (than without delay) which encourages the controller not make hasty firing decisions, facing
relatively large firing costs. Or since there is a chance that the process moves to the left during the delay
period due to voluntary quits, this effect may help to reduce firing costs even though the decision making
is postponed.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we give a new characterization of the value function of one-sided and two-sided impulse
control problems with implementation delays. We also provided easily implemented algorithms to find
out the optimal control and the value function. Our methodology bypasses the need to guess the form of
solution of quasi-variational inequalities and prove that this solution satisfies a verification lemma. Since
our method directly finds the value function, we believe that this method can solve a larger set of problems
than just with quasi-variational inequalities. Indeed, we applied our results to solving some specific
examples. As an important application of a two-sided impulse control problem with decision delays
we found out the optimal hiring and firing decisions of a firm facing regulatory delays and stochastic
demand.
22
5 10 15 20
-20
-10
10
g
(a)
20 40 60 80 100
50
100
150
200
rHx, cL
(b)
100000 200000 300000 400000
60
80
100
120
R1HshiftedL, W
(c)
1 2 3 4
37.7
37.8
37.9
38.1
R2HshiftedL, W
(d)
10 20 30
-60
-40
-20
20
40
vN, vD
(e)
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
vN-vD
(f)
0.5 1 1.5 2
-0.05
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
vD’HxL
(g)
20 40 60
-3
-2
-1
vD’HxL
(h)
Figure 2: (a) The graph of g(x). (b) The graph of r(x, c∗) for ∆ > 0 (c) The graph of line ρ∗y + τ∗ we obtain
via our algorithm and R1(y, c∗) after it is shifted vertically by e(b−r)∆(ρF (c) + τ) ϕ(c)ϕ(F−1(y)) . (d) The graph of
the line ρ∗y + τ∗ and R2(y, c∗) after it is shifted (see (3.28) for the amount of shift). (e) The two value functions,
vN (x) (∆ = 0) above and vD(x) (∆ > 0) below. (f) Plot of difference, vN (x) − vD(x). (f) Plot of difference,
vN (x) − vD(x). (g) (h)The derivatives match at x = p and x = d (∆ > 0).
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Here we considered a problem in which the decision maker needs to decide whether to take action and,
after some delay, needs to decide the magnitude of her action. In the future, we will consider problems
in which the decision maker takes action and waits that action to be implemented. We will also consider
a general characterization of the value function and the optimal controls when the decision delay is not a
constant but it depends on the magnitude of the action taken as in [24] or it depends on the value of the
state variable that is controlled as in [3].
Acknowledgment
We are grateful to the the referee for his/her detailed comments that helped us improve the manuscript.
5 Appendix
5.1 Derivations of (3.14) and (3.31)
Using (3.11) we can write (3.14) as
g(ξ) = Eξ0
[∫ ∞
0
Aµξµe(b−r)t exp(−(b+ δ)µt− σµBt − 1
2
σ2µt)dt
]
− wEξ0
[∫ ∞
0
ξ exp(−(b+ δ)t− σBt − 1
2
σ2t)dt
]
= Aµξµ
∫ ∞
0
exp
[
t
(
b− r − (b+ δ)µ − 1
2
σ2µ+
1
2
σ2µ2
)]
dt−wξ
∫ ∞
0
exp(−(b+ δ)t)dt,
(5.1)
from which we obtain (3.30) under the assumption that r > b. Here the second inequality follows from
the Fubini’s theorem and using the Laplace transform of Bt.
In what follows we will present the derivation of (3.31). We can write (3.20) as
r(ξ, c) = e(b−r)∆Eξ0
[
(−c3(ξ∆ − c)− c4ξ∆) 1{ξ∆>c} + (−c1(c− ξ∆)− c2ξ∆)1{ξ∆<c}
− k1ξµ∆ − k2ξ∆ + k1cµ + k2c
] (5.2)
Using (3.11) and the assumption that σt = σ ∈ R+, we compute
A , Eξ0
[
1{ξ∆>c}
]
= N(d2), B , E
ξ
0
[
1{ξ∆<c}
]
= 1−A = N(−d2),
C(θ) , Eξ
[
ξθ∆
]
= ξθ exp
(
−
(
b+ δ +
1
2
σ2(1− θ)
)
θ∆
)
,
(5.3)
where θ = 1 or θ = µ. Here the third equality follows from the Laplace transform of Bt We will also
need to compute
D , Eξ0
[
ξ∆1{ξ∆>c}
]
. (5.4)
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We will denote
κ = exp
(
−1
2
σ2∆+ σ
√
∆η
)
,
in which η = B∆/
√
∆, is an N(0, 1) random variable. Then ξ∆ = ξ exp(−(b + δ)∆)κ and A =
ξe−(b+δ)∆Eξ0
[
1{ξ∆>c}κ
]
. Introducing a new probability measure Q by the radon-nikodym derivative
dQξ/dP ξ0 = κ, we get
D = e−(b+δ)∆ξQξ(ξ∆ > c).
Under the measure Qξ , n , −η − σ√∆ is N(0, 1) and we can write ξ∆ in terms of n as
ξ∆ = ξ exp
(
−(b+ δ − 1
2
σ2)∆ + σ
√
∆n
)
. (5.5)
Using (5.5), we can compute
D = ξe−(b+δ)∆N(d1), (5.6)
in which d1 is given by (3.32). We can then immediately obtain,
E , Eξ0
[
ξ∆1{ξ∆<c}
]
= ξe−(b+δ)∆(1−Qξ(ξ∆ > c)) = ξe−(b+δ)∆N(−d1). (5.7)
Using (5.2), (5.3), (5.4) and (5.7) we obtain (3.20).
5.2 A Technical Lemma
Lemma 5.1. Define
G(x, γ) , sup
τ∈S
E
x[e−ατ (h(X0τ ) + γe
−α∆)], x ∈ R, γ ∈ R,
for some Borel function h. Then for γ1 > γ2 we have that
G(x, γ1)−G(x, γ2) ≤ γ1 − γ2.
Proof. See the proof of Lemma 3.3 in [11].
5.3 Proof of Proposition 2.8
The proof follows from the analysis of the function r. The following remark will be helpful in the
analysis that follows.
Remark 5.1. Let us denote H(y) , (h/ϕ) ◦ (F−1(y)), y > 0. If h(·) is twice-differentiable at x ∈ I
and y , F (x), then H ′(y) = m(x) and H ′′(y) = m′(x)/F ′(x) with
m(x) =
1
F
′
(x)
(
h
ϕ
)′
(x), and H ′′(y)[(A− α)h(x)] ≥ 0, y = F (x), (5.8)
with strict inequality if H ′′(y) 6= 0.
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5.3.1 The Analysis of the Function r in (2.47)
Let us check the sign of
(
r
ϕ
)′
(x) = r
′ϕ−rϕ′
ϕ2
(x) which is the same as the derivative of R as can be
observed from the first equation in (5.8). The sign of
(
r
ϕ
)′
(x) is the same as that of
√
2α
α
(
x2 − a2 +∆− 2αλ∆exp
(
−(a− x)
2
4∆2
)
− cα
)
+ λ(a− x)
(
− 1
∆
exp
(
−(a− x)
2
4∆2
)
+
1
∆
φ
(
a− x
∆
)
+
√
2α
(
2N
(
a− x
∆
)
− 1
))
+
2x
α
+ λ
(
2N
(
a− x
∆
)
− 1
)
. (5.9)
Using the fact 2N
(
a−x
∆
)
< 1 for x > a and− 1∆ exp
(
− (a−x)2
4∆2
)
+ 1∆φ
(
a−x
∆
)
< 0 for x > a sufficiently
large,in this equation (for sufficiently large x) we identify the absolute value of the negative terms as√
2α
α λ∆exp
(
− (a−x)2
4∆2
)
<
√
2α
α λ∆ , cα and |λ
(
2N
(
a−x
∆
)− 1) | < λ. Since these negative terms
are bounded, if we take sufficiently large value, say a′, the sign of (5.9) is positive for x ∈ (a′,∞).
Moreover, we can directly calculate limy→+∞ ∂∂yR(y; a) = 0 to check the behavior of R(y; a) for a
large y. We also know that R(y; a) , (r(·, a)/ϕ(·)) ◦ F−1(y) is negative at y = F (a). On the other
hand, 1/ϕ(F−1(y)) = √y is increasing and concave function. It follows that R(y; c) + γ
ϕ(F−1(y))
is an
increasing function on y ∈ (F (a′),∞).
To investigate the concavity of R(y; a), we set
q(x, a) ,
1
2
x2
λ
∆
(
e−
(a−x)2
∆
(
1− 2(a− x)
2
4∆2
)
− 3φ
(
a− x
∆
)
− λ(a− x)φ′
(
a− x
∆
))
+ αx2 − αr(x, a)
so that (A − α)r(x, a) = q(x, a) for every x > 0. We have limx→∞ q(x) = −∞ if α < 4. By the
second equation in (5.8), the function R(y; a) becomes concave eventually. Since R(·; a) is increasing
and concave on (a′′,∞) for some a′′ > a′ and limy→∞R(y; a) = ∞ we can find a unique linear
majorant to Rγ(·, a) in Lemma 2.3 (the linear majorant majorizes Rγ(·, a) in the continuation region and
is equal to Rγ(·, a) in the stopping region). The rest of the proof from Proposition 2.7.
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